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We consider a set of downstream firms each of which has a stochastic requirement for a
particular input. Downstream firms can produce the input themselvea yet do not trade it.
Upstream firms produce the input to aell it through a Walrasian mazket to downstream
firms. Efficient risk pooling requires that the input is produced by upstream firms and
traded in the market. Yet, downstream firms will always vertically integrate. By producing
some of its own input needs, a downstream firm cuts down aggregate input demand and
thus depresses prices in the market.
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Uncertainty about the supply of inputs has often been given as a reason for vertical
upstream integration. For example, Chandler (1969, p. 37) in his discussion of the history
of the largest U.S. companies argues that the strategy for vertical integration had come
from the desire to have a more certain supply of stocks, raw materials, and other supplies.
In a similar spirit, the transactions cost literature (see, e.g., Coase (1937), Malmgren
(1961), and Williamson (1971)) argues that uncertainty can make it difficult to deal in
factor markets and thus creates an incentive for vertical upstream integration in order to
bypass these problems by transferring goods internally.
Nevertheless, formal analyses on the effects of uncertainty about input supplies as an
incentive for vertical upstream integration are rather rare. Arrow (1975) analyzes a model
where it is assumed that vertically integrated firms obtain information about the input's
supply conditions earlier than non-integrated firms. This information advantage creates a
tendency towards complete vertical upstream integration.
Green (1986) considers a model where downstream firms face no uncertainty in their
product market and sell all of their output at the exogenous market price. The input
market is beset by exogenous stochastic demand. Input prices are fixed so that downstream
firms may be rationed. To avoid rationing and to internalize the price system, downstream
firms tend to fully integrate even though they are (slightly) less efficient than upstream
firms. By additionally taking risk attitudes of the traders into account, Hendrikse and
Peters (1989) obtain partial vertical integration as an equilibrium markeL structure in a
setup in the spirit of Green.
Carlton (1979) analyzes a model where uncertainty from the product market transmits
into the input market. Again fixed prices prevail on the input market so that rationing
may occur. To rule out full integration, Carlton assumes that an integrated firm cannot
sell its input on the market and may, therefore, be stuck with inputs for which it has2
no use. The equilibrium market structure is characterized by partial vertical upstream
integration. Risk averse downstream firms wish to secure their high probability demand.
Closest to our analysis is an interesting paper by Bolton and Whinston (1990). They
consider a setup where a single upstream firm produces an input that is used by two down-
stream firms. The upstream firm has random capacity so that supplies may be insufficient
to meet both downstream firms' needs. As in Grossman and Hart (1986), ex ante con-
tracts can only be written about the allocation of ownership over the productive assets.
Thia leads to ex post bargaining over the procurement of the input. In this setup, Bolton
and Whinston analyze different ownetship structures. Perhaps the major difference to our
analysis is that in Bolton and Whinston the input is transferred from the upstream firm
to the downstream firms through a bargaining process in which the owner of the upstream
firm gets a share of the surplus that the input generates for downstream firms. Since
downstream firms do not appropriate the entire surplus, they engage in inefiiciently low
ex ante investments which in turn creates an incentive to vertically integrate. Instead, in
our model the input is transferred through a market with flexible prices in which upstream
firms have no market power.
We consider a finite set of downstream firms each of which has a stochastic requirement
for a particular input-less in bad times than in good times. Downstream firms either
produce the input themselves or purchase it through a Walrasian market from upatream
firms that have no market power. Up- and downstream firms have access to the same
input technology. 'fo produce the input, a firm has to build up capacity at a fixed cost.
If a firm has a certain capacity level, it can produce any quantity of the input that does
not exceed capacity at a constant marginal cost. We assume, as is quite common in the
literature (see, e.g., Williamson (1985)~, that a downstream firm that produces the input
itself does not sell it.' Up- and downstream firms simultaneously pick capacity levels.
Nature then determines each downstream firm's input requirement. If a downstream firm's3
input requirement exceeds its own capacity, it shows up on the input market with positive
demand. If market demand exceeds market supply, a high price prevaiLg and vice versa so
that the input market clears. Up- and downstream firms aze risk neutral.
To begin with, we show that full integration always constitutes an equilibrium market
structure. That is, all downstream firms have a capacity that allows to produce the
maximum input requirement in good times and that is paztly idle in bad times. However,
this equilibrium is inefficient. Since downstream firms do not sell the input, they cannot
pool their input requirements. Risk pooling can only be achieved if the input is produced by
upstream firms and traded in the market. For example, the situation where downstream
firms do not produce the input at all and purchase their needs on the mazket is more
e(ficicnt than thc full integratioi~ cquilibriurn. Nevertheless, this non-integration situation
never constitutes a market equilibrium. If a downstream firm starts producing some of its
own input needs, it cuts down aggregate demand and thus depresses prices in the input
market. This favorable price effect outweighs the risk of idle capacity in bad times given
that the vertically integrated capacity is not too large. It follows from this result that the
input market will always be characterized by vertical upstream integration.
The following two questions then arise: when will we observe an efficient level of
partial vertical upstream integration and under which conditions will the input market
be characterized by too much vertical integration? The answer to the first question is
fairly negative. If the model's parameters happen to be such that upstream firms make
expected zero profits, then there exists an equilibrium with an efficient level of partial
vertical upstream integration. However, the parameter constellation is unlikely to hold.
Our last result gives sufhcient conditions for too much vertical upstream integration. If
the zero profit condition fails to hold and the input requirement in good times is sufficiently
high, downstream firms will have an inefficiently high level of vertically integrated capacity.
The favorable effect of depressing market prices outweighs the loss from idle capacity in4
bad times.
We thus show that although an input market is characterized by flexible prices and
no strategic power of upstream firms, downstream firms will always vertically integrate.
Furthermore, the level of vertical upstream integration is often inefficiently high.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model. In
section III we derive our results about the equilibrium market structures.
II. The Model
Consider a set of n identical downstream firms indexed by a- 1, ..., n. Each down-
stream firm faces stochastic demand for its output that can either be high or low. To
produce the output, downstream firms need a particular input. If demand for its output is
low, i.e., in bad times, a firm needs less of the input than in good times. Formally, denote
a downstream firm's input requirement by
ia -
( x, with probability Pr(x) E (0,1);
i, with probability Pr(i) - 1- Pr(x),
a- 1, ..., n. Let x, i E IN, i.e., there is a smallest unit of account for the input and
a downstream firm always needs some input. Moreover, i- x C x c i. Measured in
input terms, good times are not more than twice as good as bad times. Let x 1 0 denote
the downstream firms' reservation price per unit of the input. Accordingly, at price ~r
downstream firms are indifferent between obtaining and forgoing a unit of the input. As
an interpretation think of rr as the price of a backstop substitute for the input, i.e., an
expensive yet still profitable substitute that is available in abundant supply.'
Downstream firms' input requirements are stochastically independent.9 Once nature
picked each downstream firm's input requirement, a state of the world can be described
by the n x 1 vector whose ath component denotes downstream firm a's input requirement5
x or i. Denote the possible states by ?;; , i- 0, .. , n, j- 1, ...,~n" ~~. The index i
denotes the number of components of E;; that equal i. Call a state where i firms have
input requirement i of order i. The index j denotes the number of states of order i.
Accordingly, the state of the world is a random variable ? that is distributed according to
- with Pr - Pr x ~"-'~Pr x i- 0 n - 1 ( n '- - ~.i (~~i ) (-) ( -)~ , . . . , i 7 i . . . , 1 n - i
Let e be the 1 x n unit vector. Define X; - eH;; -(n - i)x f ii, i- 0,...,n. The
number X; denotes aggregate input requirement in a state of order i. Aggregate input
requirement is thus a random variable X-~á-1 áa that is distributed according to
n
X- X; with Pr(X;) - Pr(8;;), i- 0, ..., n.
n-i
There are m identical upstream firms indexed by 6- 1, ..., m. Upstream firms
produce the input to sell it through a market to downstream firms. Upstream firms
produce the input according to the following technology. Since downstream firms use the
same technology, we will not distinguish between up- and downstream when we describe
the technological setup and simply talk about firms.
To produce the input, a firm has to build up capacity y E INo at a unit cost f 1 0.
If a firm has capacity y, it can produce any quantity of the input v G y, v E INo at a
constant marginal cost c~ 0. It is not possible to produce v 1 y. The input technology is
thus given by the cost function
C(v, y~ -
f y -~ cv, if v G y;
(1)
oo, otherwise.
We assume that upstream firm 6 chooses capacity y" E{0,1}, b- 1, ..., m. Under this
assumption upstream firms have no strategic power which in turn makes market exchange6
as attractive as possible for downstream firms. Specifically, this assumption ensures the
existence of equilibria where upstream firms make expected zero profits. Let m 1 X„ - tti,
i.e., there aze enough upstream firms to be able to produce the maximum aggregate input
requirement.
Downstream firms can produce the input themselves according to the technology (1).
Downstream firm a chooses capacity ya E INo , a- 1, ..., n. Downstream firms that
produce the input do not sell it. It might not be profitable for downstream firms to digress
from marketing their output by additionally selling the input. The input mazket might
also be regulated such that downstream firms may produce their own input requirement
but are not allowed to become sellers of the input.'
Let
f e (a - e)Pr(i). (2)
Assumption (2) implies the following. If there is no market for the input, a downstream
firm holds capacity i to be able to produce its maximum requirement itself rather than
forgo some input.
Let us now turn to the formulation of the game. Downstream firms strategically
pick capacity y„ E IN,,, a- 1,...,n. All downstream firms exhaust their own input
capacity and purchase the remaining requirement on the market should this be necessary.
Downstream firm a's input demand is thus a random variable da - max[0, ia - yo~, a-
1, ..., n. Let the random variable of n x 1 vectors of individual demands be ~. Finally,
denote aggregate input demand by D-~á- I da .
Simultaneously with downstream firms, upstream firm 6 chooses as a strategic variable
the capacity y" E{0, 1}, b- 1, ... , m. Call an upstream firm that picks capacity 1 active
and inactive if it chooses capacity 0. Upstream firms tell an auctioneer their capacity
y", b - 1, ..., m. Denote upstream firms' aggregate capacity by Y -~6-1 y". Call Y
market capacity.Nature then determines each downstream firm's input requirement. Downstream firms





If aggregate demand does not exceed mazket capacity, price equals mazginal produc-
tion cost. At the rockbottom price p- c active upstream firms are indifferent between
producing and not producing the input. Accordingly, in a buyers' market each active
upstream firm makes a loss j.
If aggregate demand exceeds market capacity, price equals downstream firms' reserva-
tion price. At the sky-high price p-~r downstream firms are indifferent between obtaining
and forgoing the input. In a sellers' market active upstream firms make a profit (~r - c- j).
Note that the pricing rule clears the market. Thus, no rationing prevails.b
Up- and downstream firms are risk neutral. Upstream Hrm b, 6- 1, ..., m maximizes
with respect to y" expected profits
Gb(y', . ,ym,y~,...,y..) -
r(~r - c) ~D ~Y Pr(D) - j~ 'f yb - 1~
jll otherwise. 0,
Downstream firm a, a- 1, . .., n minimizes with respect to ya the expected costs of ob-
taining the input
Ka(y,,...,y,.,Y) -
jy„ f c2Pr(x) f ciPr(i) f (~r - c) max[O,a - ya~ ~ eè ~ r n
è,-~.s~lo.:-v.l
Pr(~)~-
(ar - c) max[0, 2- ya [~ ~n ~ r n Pr(0).
d,-~~a:~o.:-v.ln
A downstream firm has to pay marginal cost e in any case whether it produces the input
itself or purchases the ir.put on the market. It pays the amount (ar - c) in excess of
marginal cost on the market if aggregate demand exceeds market capacity, i.e., if D~ Y
or equivalently if e0 1 Y. We focus on Nash-equilibria of the simultaneous move game.
III. Market Structure
Let ua now derive mazket structures for our input mazket. We will identify the degree
of vertical upstream integration by the amount of capacity downatream firms have. Let us
start with the full integration equilibrium that always exista.
Proposition 1: Therc ezists an equi(ibrium where downatream firme piek eapaeity ya -
i, a- 1, ..., n and upatream firms choose capaeity y" - 0, 6- 1, ..., m.
Proof: Suppose all upstream firms pick y" - 0 so that market capacity Y- 0. This implies
p- n HD ~ 0. Take z E IN and consider w.l.o.g. downstream firm 1. Downstream firm
1 will never deviate with capacity yl - i-}- z. It incurs a fixed cost jz without ever using
the additional capacity. Now take i 1 z 1 0. If downstream firm 1 deviates with capacity
yl - i- z we have
K, (i - z, y, ,..., y„ , Y) - j(i - z) f cxPr(x) ~- ciPr(i)f
(rr - c) max(0, z - (i - z)~Pr(z) t (~r - c)zPr(z) )
fi t cxPr(x) f ciPr(i) f(rr - c)zPr(i) - fz ~ ji f csPr(x) f ciPr(i) -
K,(y~,.. ,y,.,Y)
where the last inequality follows from assumption (2). Thus, given Y- 0, it is optimal for
downstream firms to have capacity ya - i, a- 1, ..., n.
Conversely, if all downstream firms have capacity ya - i, aggregate demand D- 0.
Upstream firms thus never sell any input. Building up capacity yb - 1 yields losses for an9
upstream firm because it incurs a fixed cost J without obtaining any revenue.
Q.E.D.
The existence of the full integration equilibrium is an immediate consequence of (2).
Assumption (2) says that the probability of good times is sufficiently high so that it is
worthwhile to have capacity ya - i. The capacity i is only partly used in bad times. Yet,
the cost to forgo some input in good times outweighs the cost of idle capacity in bad times.
However, the full integration equilibrium typically is inefficient. Downstream firms do
not sell the input. Accordingly, they cannot pool their input requirements.e Risk pooling
can only be achieved if the input is produced by upstream firms and traded in the market.
Typically, such a market structure is more efficient than the full integration equilibrium.
To be more specific, consider an example. Suppose n- 3, a- 1, i- 2, Pr(x) - 1~2,
j- 1, c- 1, and ~r - 3. In the full integration equilibrium downstream firm a's cost
Ka (2, 2, 2, 0) - 3.5, a- 1, 2, 3. Now consider the non-integration situation where all
downstream firms have capacity ya - 0 so that 0- ~ and D- X. Suppose the first 4
upstream firms are active so that market capacity Y- 4. Thus, if D E {3,4}, p - c, and
if D E{5,6}, p-~r. Active upstream firms' aggregate expected profits
~G-~ Gb(-) - cD,1~8 f cD23~8 f~rY1~2 - [eD,1~8 f cD,3~8 f cY1~2 f fY] - 0.
An active upstream firm has fixed cost J. In a buyers' market p- c and active upstream
firms do not recover fixed costs. Yet, in a sellers' market p-~r and each active upstream
firm earns a contribution margin (~r - c) ~ 0. If Y- 4, f- (~r - c) ~~ ~Y Pr(D), i.e.,
active upstream firms make expected zero profits. Accordingly, all upstream firms are as
well off as in the full integration equilibrium.
A downstream firm's cost of obtaining the input in the non-integration situation is
K„ (0, 0, 0, 4) - cx1~2 t ci1~2 ~- (~r - c)x1~8 ~- (R - c)i3~8 - 3.25, a- 1, 2, 3,io
i.e., all downstream firms are better off in the non-integration situation than in the full
integration equilibrium.
This improvement may be explained as follows. Downstream firms pay the mazkup
(rr - c) with probability ~D~Y Pr(D). Suppose whenever there is a sellers' mazket,
downstream firm a has high demand i, i.e., ~eè~Y~ Pr(0) - 0. The downstream firm
s,-:
then always pays the markup for the high quantity, i.e., it pays (a-e)i ~D ~Y Pr(D) - ji
in excess of marginal costs. Accordingly, purchasing the input in the market or having
capacity y„ - i amounts to the same in this case. If, however, as in our example, a sellers'
market coincides with d„ - x, i.e., ~ ~o ~ Y ~ Pr(~) ~ 0, the downstream firm pays in
è,-:
excess of marginal costs
(7r - e)x~.d~ rn Pr(~) t(x - c)x~eÀ~Y~ Pr(0) G (~r - c)i~D~Y Pr(D) - Ji.
è,-- è,-s
The market charges the fair expected price (~r - c) ~D~Y Pr(D) - j to recover active
upstream firms' fixed costs. If a downstream firm is lucky and has low input demand
d„ - z in a sellers' market, it is strictly better off in the non-integration situation than in
the full integration equilibrium. Notice that (a - e) ~D ~ i, Pr(D) - j and
~eÀ~Yn Pr(0)~0 p YGD„-i
~(. -
are sufficient conditions for the non-integration situation to be more efficient than the full
integration equilibrium.
Given that the non-integration situation is typically more efficient than the full inte-
gration equilibrium, it seems worthwhile to investigate under which conditions the non-
integration situation constitutes an equilibrium. In the next Proposition we will show that
the non-integration situation never constitutes a market equilibrium. It followa from this
result that in any equilibrium market structure we observe vertical upstream integration.ii
Proposition 2: There does not exist an equilibrium where downstream firms pick eapaeity
y„ - y, a- 1, ..., n vnth y E [0, 2x - i], y E INo .
Proof: Suppose on the contrary that there exiats an equilibrium where downstream firms
pick capacitY ya - y, a- 1, ..., n, y E [0, 2x - i], y E INo. Then d, - da (y) - ia - y,
a-1,...,n,0-0(y)-~-e'y,andÍJ-D(y)-X-ny.
Let Y- Y(y) - max{Y E INo~j G (~r - e) ~D~Y Pr(D)}. The upstream firms'
equilibrium aggregate capacity Y- Y(y) satisfies Y G Y. If Y) Y, Y E IN, j 1
(~r - c) ~D ~Y Pr(D). All active upstream firms make expected losses and are better off
if they become inactive.
If j~(~r - c)~1 - Pr(x)"~, Y G D,,. Market capacity is so low that there is always
a sellers' market. By assumption (2) downstream firms pick y„ - i, a- 1, ..., n. Ac-
cordingly, y„ - y, a- 1, ..., n, y E[0, 22 - iJ dces not constitute an equilibrium in this
case.
Now consider the converse case where f G (~r - c) ~1 - Pr(x)" ~ so that Y 1 Do. That
is, there is a buyers' market with positive probability. Suppose downstream firm 1 devíates
with y, - x 1 y while ya - y, a- 2, ..., n. Downstream firm 1's input demand is thus
d; - i, - x, the vector of individual demands ~' - 0- w(x - y) where w is the n x 1
vector whose first component is 1 and the others are 0, and D' - D-(x - y).
Since i - x G x, we have D~ G D;-1i i- 1,...,n and thus ~D~Y Pr(D) G
~D,~Y Pr(D'). That is, if downstream firm 1 switches to y, - x there is more often a




Kl (yl ,... , y„ , Y) - fy i- czPr(y) t ciPr(i)t
(~r-c)(x-y)~eÀ~j'n P'(0)-t-(a-c)(.i-y)~~n~rn PT(~) i
d~-?-v é,-:-v
fx { cxPr(x) -}- ciPr(z~ t (~r - c)(i - x) ~ ~~Y~ Pr(0) 1
.i,-:-v
fx t czPr(x) ~- ciPr(i) f(rr - c)(i - x) ~~o.~rn Pr(0') -
àá-:-~
K!(i~ys,.. ,y,.,Y),
where the first inequality follows from algebraic manipulations and the observation that
Y G Í'. Consequently, downstream firm 1 is strictly better off if it picks yl - x instead of
y, - y E [0, 2z - i~.
Q.E.D.
Let us explain this result by means of the example. If ya - 0, a- 1, 2, 3, an upstream
firms' best response entails Y E {3, 4}. Suppose Y - 4 so that 4 upstream firms are active.
This upstream firms' best response is most favorable one for downstream firms because
active upstream firms make expected zero profits, i.e., f-(rr - c) ~D~ y, Pr(D).
Suppose downstream firm 1 switches from yl - 0 to yl - 1 so that di - il - x and
D' - X- x. Then we have p- c if D' E {2, 3, 4} and p-~r if D' - 5. Accordingly, the
probability of a sellers' market decreases from 1~2 to 1~8. If downstream firm 1 unilaterally
deviates with y, - 1 we have Kl (1,0,0,4) - fx f cx1~2 f ci1~2 f (~r - c)0 . 3~8 t(~r -
c) (i - x)1 ~8 - 2.75 G 3.25 - Ki (0, 0, 0, 4). Consequently, downstream firm 1 is strictly
better off if it picks capacity yl - 1 instead of capacity yl - 0.
Downstream firm 1 pays the fair expected markup f-(~r - c) ~D~Y Pr(D) on the
rnarket. Downstream firm 1 needs x for sure and an additional (i - x) when it faces13
good times. If downstream firm 1 purchases its entire input needs on the mazket, the
amount it pays in excess of marginal costs equals (~r - c)x~D~Y Pr(D) ~- (n - c)(i -
?) ~ ~n ~ r n Pr(0) - fx-} (~r - c) (i - x) ~ eè ~Y ~ Pr(0). Accordingly, if the probability
è, -: à, -:
of a sellers' mazket coinciding with downstream firm 1's high demand would not change by
the switch to yl - x, downstream firm 1 were indifferent between yl - 0 and yl - x. But
this probability decreases. Recall that D; -D;-1 - i-a, i- 1,...,n. Since x 1 i-x, we
have D~ G D;-„ i- 1,...,n and therefore ~~,~Y Pr(D') C ~D~Y Pr(D). By building
up capacity y, - x, downstream firm 1 cuts down aggregate demand by an amount large
enough to increase the probability of a glut. Let k' - min{k E{0,...,n}[Dk 1 Y}.
Since k' 1 1, there exists Ok.;, e~k.; - Dk. ~ Y, with dl - i. If downstream firm
1 switches to yl - z, Ok.~ - Ok.; -( x,0,...,0)' and e0k.~ - D'k. C Y. Accordingly,
~~d~ " rn Pr(0) ~~en'~rn Pr(0'). That is, by the switch to yl - z downstream
è, -s è; -:-:
firm 1 decreases the probability of a seller's market coinciding with its own high demand.
Consequently, if downstream firm 1 unilaterally deviates with yl - x, it is strictly better
off and the non-integration situation cannot be an equilibrium.
We have thus shown that we will always observe some vertical upstream integration.
A downstream firm that builds up capacity has to take into account the following effects.
The first unfavorable effect is that building up capacity has a fixed cost f. The second
unfavorable effect is that the downstream firm may run the risk of idle capacity. The first
favorable effect is that the downstream firm can produce the input itself at marginal cost
c. The second favorable effect is that the downstream firm cuts down aggregate demand
and may thus decrease the probability that high prices prevail on the input market.
Now consider a downstream firm that switches from capacity y E [0, 2x-z~ to capacity
x. If upstream firms make expected zero profits given that all downstream firms pick
capacity y, the first unfavorable and first favorable effect cancel.' The second favorable14
effect is zero because the downstream firm needs x for sure. Yet, the second favorable effect
is strictly positive. The switch to x decreases aggregate input demand by an amount large
enough to decrease the probability that high prices prevail on the input market. Overall
then, it is attractive for downstream firms to build up positive capacity.
Note that the downstream firms' incentive to build up capacity is strict. Accordingly,
our non~xistence result still holds if downstream firms have a`slightly worse' technology
than upstream firms, i.e., if, for example, downstream firms' fixed cost is j' - j~- e with
e 1 0 and small. However, if downstream firms' fixed cost is f', any vertical upstream
integration is inefficient. Upstream firms can build up the same capacity at a lower cost.
Thus, in this case we may immediately conclude that we observe an inefficiently high level
of vertical upstream integration on the input market.
This last discussion raises the following two questions: when will we observe an efïicient
level of vertical upstream integration and under which conditions will the input market
be characterized by too much vertical integration? These questions are dealt with in the
next two Propositions. In Proposition 3 we show that given parameters are such that
upstream firms make expected zero profits, there exists an equilibrium with an efíicient
level of partial vertical upstream integration.
Proposition 3: Let y E (2x - i, x], y E IN, and D(y) - X- ny. If there exists
Y(z) - min{Y E INo ~(rr - c) ~D~~~~Y Pr(D(x)) - j}, there exists an equitiórium where
downstream firms choose capacity ya - y, a- 1, .. ., n and upstream firms piek yb -
1, 6-1,...,Y(y) andy'-0, 6-i'(y)tl,...,m, t~yE(2x-i,x], yEIN.
Proof: First notice that the existence of Y(x) implies the existence of Y(y) Vy E(2x -
i, x], y E IN. If all downstream firms decrease capacity by (x-y), D(y) - D(x) - n(z-y).
Then Y(y) - Y(x) f n(x - y) satisfies (~r - c) ~D~v~~y,~v~ Pr(D(y)) - f. Next note that
Y(y) - Dk (y) for some k- 0, ..., n - 1. All active upstream firms make expected zero
profits. Consequently, no inactive firm wishes to become active and vice versa.is
Let da - da (y) - ïa - y, a- 1, ..., n and ~- 0(y) -,-, - e'y, D- D(y), and
Y- Y(y). Take 0 G z G(i - y), z E IN. Consider downstream firm 1 that deviates with
yl - y f z. Accordingly, d~ - max[o, dl - z], ~' - 0-w(dl - d'i ), and D' - D-(dl - d'1).
We then have
~. Pr(D) - ~, Pr(D') and
D1Y D'~Y ~~n~rn Pr(~) - ~ ~n'~rn Pr(~~)'
4~-s-v d~-s-v-i
If downstream firm 1 increases capacity by z, it does not cut down aggregate demand by
an amount large enough to change the probability of a glut or the probability of a sellers'
market coinciding with its own high demand. This implies
K~(y f z,Yz,...,Yn,Y) - Í(yf z) f cxPr(x) f ciPr(i)f
(~-c)max[o, x-y-z]~ ~n'~Yn Pr(0')t
à~-ms~~o.:-v-~I
(rr - c)(2 - y- z) ~ ~n'~rn Pr(0~) ~
è;-:-v-:
Jy t cxPr(x) f ciPr(i) ~- (~r - c) max[o,x - y] ~ eè'~rA Pr(0')-F
è,-m,x~o.:-v-~I




where the last equality follows from the definition of Y and the observation that firm 1's
switch to y~ z leaves the probabilities of the market contingencies unchanged. Conse-
quently, downstream firm 1 is not better off by the switch from y, - y to yi - y t z.
Now take z- i- y and suppose downstream firm 1 deviates with y, - y f z- i.16
Then we have
K, (2,Ys,...,y,.,Y) - Ix t cxPr(x) t ciPr(i) -
jy t cxPr(x) t ciPr(i) t(~r - e)(i - y) ~D ~ r Pr(D) ~




Accordingly, downstream firm 1 is not better off by the switch from yl - y to yl - i.
Finally, take z E(0, y~, z E W. Suppose downstream firm 1 deviates with y~ - y- z
so that d~ - d, t z, ~' - ~ t~z, and D' - D t z. We then have
uD1Y Pr(D) ~ ~d'~r
Pr(D') and ~~n~rn Pr(~) C ~ ~n'~rn Pr(0~)'
à,-s-v à,-s-vt:
Accordingly, if downstream 1 switches from yl - y to y, - y- z it increases market
demand and thus the probability of a sellers' market. This implies
Ki (y - z, ya , . . . , y~ , Y) - Í(y - z) t czPr (x) ~- ciPr(i) t
(7f-C)(x-y~-z)~ e~'~Yn Pr(~I)t(7f-C)(i-ytz)~ eÀ'~]'n Pr(~,)-
~~---vf. à~-:-vt.
jy t cxPr(x) ~- ciPr(i) t (~r - c)(x - y) ~ ~o,~Yn Pr(0')-~
e~-:-Yt:




where the last inequality follows from the observation that downstream firm 1's switch to
y- z increases the probability that high prices prevail. Consequently, downstream firm 117
is strictly worse off by having capacity y, - y- z instead of y, - y.
Q.E.D.
We have thus shown that paztial vertical upstream integration constitutes an equi-
librium given that upstream firms make expected zero profits. Downstream firms pick
a capacity level that is positive but dces not exceed z. That is, downstream firms pool
the risky part of their input requirements in the mazket. Consequently, such a market
structure is efficient. In the following discussion of this result we focus on the case where
all downstream firms pick capacity y- x.
The zero profit assumption is important for the following two reasons. Suppose up-
stream firms make positive expected profits, i.e., J G (a - c) ~p ~~, Pr(D). Unless there
are no advantages from risk pooling, a downstream firm is better off by having its own
capacity instead of relying on the market. If upstream firms make zero profits, downstream
firms face no tradeoff between paying an unfair expected price and the advantages from
risk pooling.
The second reason is more subtle. If parameters aze such that upstream firms make
zero profits, any market capacity Y E [Dk ,Dk t 1) for some k E {0, ..., n- 1} satisfies
J- (~r - c)~D)2, Pr(D). Accordingly, upstream firms are indifferent between these
capacity levels. Yet, for a partial vertical upstream equílibrium to exist, upstream firms
have to pick Y- Dk, i.e., the lowest market capacity that allows zero profits. If market
capacity Y- Dk, a small decrease of market demand dces not decrease the probability
that high prices prevaíl. That is, the incentive for downstream firms to cut down aggregate
demand to decrease the probability of a sellers' market is zero at the margin. If upstream
firms pick the highest market capacity that allows zero profits, a small decrease in mazket
demand decreases the probability of a sellers' market. Accordingly, the downstream firms'
incentive to cut down aggregate demand at the margin is strictly positive in this case. If the
expected zero profit premise fails to hold, i.e., if j G(~r-c) ~p ~~, Pr(D), Y E [Dk, Dkt, )18
for some k E {0, ... ,n- 1} and f ~(~r - c) ~~ ~ Y Pr(D), Y~ Dkt ,, upstream firms will
build up the highest market capacity that allows positive profits. Consequently, we may
conclude that the expected zero profit assumption is necessary to drive down to zero the
downstream firms' incentive to cut down aggregate demand at the margin.
Nevertheless, the zero ptofit condition holds only for special pazameter values. What
can be said about the efficiency properties of mazket structures if the zero profit condition
fails to hold? When will downstream firms have inefficiently high capacity, i.e., a capacity
level in excess of x? We have just seen that if the zero profit condition does not hold,
upstream firms build up the highest market capacity that allows positive profits. A small
decrease of aggregate demand is thus sufficient to decrease the probability of a sellers' maz-
ket. Accordingly, on the one hand, a downstream firm is tempted to increase its capacity
slightly beyond x to cut down aggregate demand. On the other hand, if a downstream
firm has capacity in excess of x, it has idle capacity in bad times. In the next Proposition
we provide a sufficient condition for the second favorable effect to outweigh the second
unfavorable effect so that we observe too much vertical integration.
Proposition 4: Let y E(2x - i,i], y E IN, and D(y) - X- ny. Suppose there does
not exist Y(x) - min{Y E INo~(a - c) ~D~:~~Y Pr(D(z)) - f}. !f i ia su~ieiently large,
there does not exist ars equilibrium where downstream firms ehoose eapaeity ya - y, a-
1, ..., n, y E(2x - i, i], y E 1N.
Proof: Suppose on the contrary that there exists an equilibrium where downstream firms
pick capacitY ya - y, a- 1, ..., n, y E (2x - i, i], y E IN. Then da - da (y) - xa - y, a-
1,...,n, and 0 - 0(y) - ~- e'y.
First notice that the non-existence of Y(x) implies the non-existence of Y(y) -
min{Y E INo~(~ - c) ~D~Y~~}, Pr(D(y)) - f} b'y E (2x - i,i], y E IN. Suppose on the
contrary that there exists Y(y) for some y G x but not Y(x). Then Y- Y(y) - n(z - y)
satisfies (n - c) ~DIy~~}, Pr(D(z)) - f, contradicting the non-existence of Y(2).19
Let Y- Y(y) - max{Y E INo ~j G(~r - c) ~D ~Y Pr(D)}. Since there doea not exist
a market capacity Y(y) where upstream firms make zero profits, the equilibrium market
capacity Y- Y(y) - Í'. If Y 1 Y, Y E IN, f~(~r - c) ~D~Y Pr(D). All active
upstream firms make expected losses and are better off if they become inactive.
If f~( ~r - c)(1 - Pr(x)"), Y C Do. Market capacity ia so low that there is always a
sellers' market. By assumption (2) downstream firms pick capacity ya - i, a- 1, ..., n.
Accordingly, y- y, a - 1, ..., n, y E(2x - i, i~ does not constitute an equilibrium in this
case.
Now consider the converse case where j c (~r - c) (1 - Pr(z)" ) so that Y 1 Do. That
is, we observe a buyers' market with positive probability. Suppose downstream firm 1
deviates with y, - y-}- 1 while y„ - y, a- 2, ..., n. Then we have
~D~Y Pr(D) ~ ~D'~r Pr(~),
and
~~n~rn Pr(0) ~ ~ ~n'~Yn Pr(0~1~
,i;-~"~x~o,~-Y-i~
[JeO~rn Pr(0) J ~ eC'~Yn
à~-2-v à~-2-v-i
Pr(~').
Upstream firms have the highest possible capacity that allows positive profits. An increase
of one unit in downstream firms' capacity is thus sufficient to decrease the probability of
a sellers' market.
We then have
K, (y f l, yz ,..., y" , Y) - f(y f 1) f cxPr(x) f ciPr(i)}
(~r-c)max~0,x-y-1]~ ~c'~rn Pr(0')f
d~-mex~O,s-q- I~
(a - c)(2 - y- 1) ~ ~n'i rn Pr(~~) C
à~-s-v-i20
Jy f exPr(2~ ~- ciPt(2~ f~~r - t~ max~0, 2 - y] ~ eè ~~ r n Pr~O~~t
è~-m.:~o.:-v- 11
(a - C)(~ - y) ~ en'~]'n Pr~O~)f
è;-s-~-i
(a-c) j- en '~}'n Pr~~~) cKil{i~...~ll ln.Y~~ ~ ~ I
è;-:-v- 1
where the last inequality holds if i is sufficiently lazge.
Q.E.D.
We have thus shown that we will observe an inefficiently high level ofvertical upstream
integration if upstream firms make positive expected profits and i is lazge. To explain this
`too much vertical integration' result, consider the situation where all downstream firms
pick capacity y- x, i.e., where they pool the risky part of their input requirements in
the market. Upstream firms then have the highest market capacity that allows positive
profits. If mazket capacity increases by one unit, all active upstream firms make expected
losses. This in turn implies that a downstream firm's switch from y- x to y- x-f 1 is
sufficient to decrease the probability of a sellers' mazket.
In terms of our four effects such a deviation impliea the following. The aum of the
first unfavorable and the first favorable effects is strictly favorable for a downstream firm.
The mazket charges a price that is too high to recover upstream firms' fixed costs. The
second unfavorable effect is strictly unfavorable for a downstream firm. The downstrea.m
firm has capacity in excess of x. The excess capacity is idle in bad times. The second
favorable effect is strictly favorable. By the switch to y- x i- 1, a downstream firm
decreases the probability of a sellers' market. This means that it geta the risky pazt of
its input requirement i- x cheaper. If ~ is sufficiently large, the second favorable effect
outweighs the second unfavorable effect. Consequently, a downstream firm will deviate
with the inefficiently high capacity level y- x-I- 1.27
IV. Conclusions
We have thus shown that although an input market is chazuterized by flexible prices
and upstream firms have no strategic power, downstream firms will always vertically in-
tegrate. If a downstream firm starts producing some of its own input needs, it cuts down
aggregate input demand and thus depresses prices in the mazket. This favorable price
effect outweighs the risk of idle capacity in bad times given that the vertically integrated
capacity is not too large. This result does not hinge on the assumption that downatream
firms do not sell the input. Moreover, we have shown that the incentive to depress prices on
the input market often leads to an inefficiently high level of vertically integrated capacity.
If we allowed for a dual market structure with downstream firms negotiating advance
contracts and spot markets ta.kinn care of random fluctuations, the incentive for vertical
upstream integration might disappear. Nevertheless, such a dual mazket structure raises
the issue of breach of contract. If high prices prevail on the spot market, upstream firms
are tempted to break the advance contract and vice veisa for downstream firms. These
problems shed doubt on the conjecture that a dual market structure works smoothly.t2
Footnotea
1) See, e.g., Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1988) for a setup where vertical foreclosure may
arise as an equilibrium phenomenon.
2) Alternatively, the reservation price may be interpreted as follows. Let the units of
account for the input be normalized such that a downstream firm needs one unit of the
input to produce one unit of the output. The price per unit of the output is independent
of the demand realization. Then ~r is a downstream firms' pro8t per unit of the output
plus the cost of one unit of the input.
3) The assumption that input requirements are i.i.d. is made for notational convenience.
All of our results also apply to the case where downstream firms differ in the probability of
bad times, i.e., Pr„(x) ~ Pr.,.(2), and the input requirements of two firms, respectively, are
not perfectly correlated, i.e., cor(ia,io.) E(-1,1), a,a' - 1,.. ,n, a~ a'. Accordingly,
all we need is that the distribution of the states of the world has full support.
4) See Carlton (1979) for a more elaborate discussion of the first argument. The Motor
Carrier Act of 1935 created the conditions given in the second argument. A license is needed
to enter the common carrier truck business. Private carriage, i.e., carriage in trucks owned
and operated by the shipper are exempted from regulation. See Kahn (1971,p. 14-21).
Note that we do not need this assumption to prove Proposition 2.
5) If D- Y, any price p E~c, ~r~ clears the market. The reason why we choose p - c
is as follows. Suppose up- and downstream firms' capacity choices are such that D- Y
occurs with positive probability and moreover that p 1 e in this case. If a downstream
firm increases its capacity by a small amount, it cuts down aggregate demand by the same
quantity. Thereby, it turns the event D- Y and p 1 c into an event where p- c.
Accordingly, the downstream firm gains (p - c) ~ 0 with positive probability. To rule out
this incentive to cut down aggregate demand at the margin we set p- c if D- Y.
6) Notice that we rule out horizontal mergers. If downstream firms merge horizontally,23
they can pool their input requirements.
7) If upstream firms make positive expected profits, the net-effect is even favorable for the
downstream firm.24
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